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on disputed legal and political issues." 8 This prohibition in Minnesota's Code of Judicial Conduct, known as the "announce clause," had been based on the 1972 American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 9 The petitioner, a candidate for the Minnesota Supreme Court, had distributed literature criticizing the court's decisions. 10 Following a disciplinary inquiry, the petitioner filed suit seeking a declaration that the clause was unconstitutional because it forced him to refrain from announcing views on disputed issues. 11 The lower federal courts rejected these claims.
12
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, identified that "the announce clause prohibits a judicial candidate from stating his views on any specific nonfanciful legal question within the province of the court for which he is running, except in the context of discussing past decisions," as long as the candidate does not oppose stare decisis. 13 Respondents pointed out that the clause left room for discussions about candidate character, education, and work habits, as well as specific positions on issues such as cameras in the courtroom.
14 The Court applied strict scrutiny because the clause "prohibits speech on the basis of its content and burdens" the speech of candidates for public office, which is a core First Amendment freedom. 15 Scalia evaluated the state interests of impartiality and the appearance of impartiality, finding that the clause was not narrowly tailored because while impartiality is a concern based on parties, the announce clause restricts speech not for or against parties, but for or against issues. 16 The clause also does not serve the interest of judicial openmindedness because sitting judges may state their views in classes, 8 White, 536 U.S. at 768. 9 Id. The ABA canon was changed in 1990 due to First Amendment concerns. Id. at 773 n.5. It was replaced with a canon prohibiting judicial candidates from making "statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court." Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5(A)(3)(d)(ii) (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 Id. at 768. The literature criticized a decision to exclude confessions from "criminal defendants that were not tape-recorded" as an indication that the court did not trust the police. White, 536 U.S. at 771. The literature also "criticized a decision requiring public financing of abortions for poor women as 'unprecedented' and a 'pro-abortion stance.' " Id.
11 Id. at 769-70. 12 Id. at 770. 13 Id. at 773. 14 White, 536 U.S. at 774. 15 Id. To survive strict scrutiny the clause must be "(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest." Id. at 774-75. 16 Id. at 775-76.
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books, and speeches, and candidate positions make up a small proportion of the positions sitting judges will take over the course of their careers.
17
Scalia identified the tension between the election of judges and the announce clause "which places most subjects of interest to the voters off limits."
18 This is not surprising because the ABA, the original proponent of the clause, has long been a supporter of judicial merit selection and an opponent of elections.
19 While opposition to elections may be well grounded, the First Amendment does not allow this goal to be achieved by leaving elections in place but "preventing candidates from discussing what the elections are about." 20 Scalia distinguished the announce clause from the clause in the state code prohibiting candidates "from making 'pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office,'-a prohibition that is not challenged here and on which we express no view." 21 Thus, announcing views "on an issue covers much more than promising to decide an issue a particular way." 22 Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter and Breyer dissented. 23 Ginsburg identified distinctions between judges and other elected officials that should lead to different First Amendment treatment. 24 Unlike other elected officials, "[j]udges . . . are not political actors," and "they serve no faction or constituency." 25 Ginsburg emphasized the importance of Minnesota's pledges or promises clause. 26 The "judicial obligation to avoid prejudgment corresponds to the litigant's [due process] right . . . to 'an impartial and disinterested tribunal. ' " 27 When candidates make promises about issues that may reach the courts, if they are elected they "will be under pressure to resist the pleas of litigants who advance posi- 39 In the course of his campaign for judicial office, William Watson sent a letter to law enforcement personnel asking them to "put a real prosecutor on the bench." 40 Watson indicated in a newspaper advertisement that "he had 'proven experience in the war against crime.' " 41 Watson also made a statement to a reporter indicating that he would reduce court caseloads by cracking down on crime, causing criminals to go elsewhere. 42 The Court of Appeals identified tension with White, finding the pledges or promises clause at issue in the case "sufficiently circumscribed" to withstand First Amendment scrutiny. 43 The clause is limited because it "precludes only those statements of intention that single out a party or class of litigants for special treatment" or convey a candidate will behave inconsistently with their judicial duties, leaving permissible "most statements identifying a point of view."
44
[S]tatements that merely express a viewpoint do not amount to promises of future conduct. On the other hand, candidates need not preface campaign statements with the phrase "I promise" before their remarks may reasonably be interpreted by the public as a pledge to act or rule in a particular way if elected. A candidate's statements must be reviewed in their totality and in the context of the campaign as a whole to determine whether the candidate has unequivocally articulated a pledge or promise of future conduct . . . . 45 Here, Watson violated this rule by expressing a bias in favor of the 37 Id. . 40 Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 41 Id. at 3. 42 Id. 43 Id. at 5-8. 44 Watson, 794 N.E.2d at 7. 45 Id. at 4.
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police and implying he would use his powers to keep certain kinds of defendants out of the city, and did so repeatedly throughout the campaign.
46
In 2009, the Commission considered charges against Margaret Chan stemming from her election campaign for New York City Civil Court. 47 Chan had released literature advertising a planned lecture that stated, "Margaret Chan and Veteran Tenant Attorney Steven DeCastro will show you how to stick up for your rights, beat your landlord, . . . and win in court!" 48 The Commission identified violations of the pledges, promises, and commitments clauses. 49 [Chan's] literature may have given prospective voters the impression that she would favor tenants over landlords in housing matters, which are often the subject of Civil Court proceedings. By distributing such literature, which appeared to commit herself with respect to issues likely to come before her court, she compromised her impartiality. 50 Commission member Richard D. Emery dissented. 51 Emery pointed out that the literature only "may have led a prospective voter to conclude that [Judge Chan] would favor tenants," which is not enough to show a promise, pledge, or commitment.
52 "[A]n election campaign by necessity must be designed to appeal to voters based on the candidate's history and activities." 53 "If certain constituents feel they can predict a judicial candidate's views on controversial subjects that s/he may have to someday face in court, that is part of the price 46 Id. The court upheld the ruling of the Commission, but modified the sanction from removal to censure. Id. at 8. 47 
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we pay for the free flow of information critical to the electoral choice of judges."
54
Emery recognized that the Court of Appeals in Watson held that implied promises of future conduct may be the basis for discipline, a decision "in tension with White."
55 But, while Watson involved implicit promises and commitments, Chan's criticism of landlords does not rise to an implied promise because a voter only may have come to the conclusion that she was pledging to rule a certain way.
56 By finding misconduct for statements that urge "voters to know their rights against landlords," which is not an actual pledge, promise, or commitment, "the Commission is adding a gloss on White that cannot be justified by any reading of that decision." The text of the letter stated the following:
As your County Judge for the past 14 years, I have been responsible for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County. My pistol permit is very important to me as I know yours is to you . . . . . . . .
As Supreme Court Justice . . . I will still be responsible for all pistol permits in Rensselaer County. 59 The Commission found that the statements conveyed bias to favor pistol permit holders and their interests, reinforcing an implied promise that he would look after their interests and thus violated the rule against improper pledges, promises, and commitments. 60 "Campaign statements that single out a particular class of litigants for special treatment are inconsistent with judicial impartiality and the appear- 54 Id. at 130. 55 Id. at 131. 56 Id. at 132. Emery noted that New York's rules were changed in 2006 to remove the prohibition on statements that " 'appear to commit' the candidate with respect to controversies and issues . . . limiting misconduct to an express commitment." Chan, supra note 47, at 132. 57 Id. at 131. The Commission made a number of decisions on similar issues prior to White. 62 In the following three instances, the Commission found a violation of the "pledges and promises" and "commit or appear to commit" clauses. 63 Matter of Birnbaum involved a brochure that "asserted that voters had a 'clear choice' between respondent . . . a tenant, and his opponent . . . a landlord." 64 The "literature gave the unmistakable impression that he would favor tenants over landlords in housing matters." 65 Matter of Hafner, Jr. involved literature "that stated: 'Are you tired of seeing career criminals get a 'slap' on the wrist? So am I'" and the phrase, referring to an opponent, that "[s]oft judges make hard criminals!" 66 The literature implied respondent "would deal harshly with all such defendants, rather than judge the merits of individual cases." 67 Matter of La Cava involved a letter sent to Right-toLife Party members in which the candidate "asserted his 'commitment to the sanctity of life from the moment of conception' " and an interview with a reporter in which the candidate stated that abortion is murder. 68 This statement "created the appearance" that La Cava "might not follow constitutional and statutory law if called upon to do so." 69 The New York State Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics ("Ethics Committee") is an independent body that responds to written ethics inquiries from state judges. 70 The Ethics Committee has de-
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termined that a candidate should not respond to a questionnaire from a pro-Second Amendment organization because the form "contains requests for positions on issues which may regularly come before the inquiring judge should the judge" be elected. 71 The Ethics Committee has held that a candidate may not distribute campaign statements that indicate an opposition to engaging in plea-bargaining in criminal cases as it would constitute an impermissible pledge or promise.
72
The Ethics Committee did find that it would be permissible to include in campaign literature a photograph taken with a relative, a state trooper in uniform, as long as the context did not suggest the candidate would favor law enforcement interests. 73 Judicial candidates are given advice about how to campaign within the boundaries of the law. The New York State Bar Association has placed on its website a guide for judicial candidates that includes a section on avoiding campaign "[p]itfalls." 74 [A] public pronouncement of these views [on disputed legal or political issues] may be seen as an indication of how the candidate would decide cases as a judge and would give the impression that the candidate would not approach a case involving those issues with an open mind. Accordingly, the candidate should not announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues if it is foreseeable that such issues may bear upon a case that may come before the court in the future. 75 The advice to judicial candidates is that to be on the safe side, a candidate should say less rather than more about their views.
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The vast majority of states that have judicial elections have some form of a pledge, promise, or commit clause in their canons of judicial conduct. 76 The constitutionality of such clauses after White has been the subject of litigation in other states. The Supreme Court of Florida has upheld the clauses. 77 Other courts have upheld the clauses with narrow constructions. 78 A number of federal district courts have found the provisions to be unconstitutional, on their face 79 or as applied. 80 Some federal appellate courts have rejected challenges to the clauses based on ripeness or standing grounds. 81 The general consensus among the scholarship is that the promises clauses are on shaky ground after White. 
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tions may be inferior to the appointment of judges. 83 But if we are to have elections, they should be elections in which voters have meaningful choice. 84 If voters cannot pick candidates based on issues, other factors will decide judicial elections. 85 Voters may choose a judge solely based on resume or qualifications, instead of choosing a judge with whom they politically or legally identify. In addition, the lack of information for voters may allow for the increased influences of the legal establishment, party leadership, or pure cronyism.
On the other hand, the state has a strong interest in an impartial judiciary. 86 This interest may be persuasive in connection to the announce, pledge, promise, or commit clauses. For example, it certainly would be problematic if a sitting judge revealed a position that implicated a case directly before his or her courtroom at that time.
87
This is less of a concern with non-incumbent judicial candidates.
In the scheme of issues facing states in the administration of judicial elections, however, broad restrictions on judicial speech should be a minor concern. A far more serious concern should be the role of money in judicial elections. 88 Judicial election spending has more than doubled between 2000 and 2009 compared to the 1990s, and was especially high during the 2010 elections. 89 A majority of Americans believe that campaign funding buys "favorable legal outcomes." 90 The Supreme Court has recently ruled that due process required a state supreme court judge to recuse himself in a situation in 83 See White, 536 U.S. at 787-88. 84 which a contributor gave that judge $3 million and the judge ruled significantly in the contributor's favor. 91 It is true that the promises clauses speak to a related interest of the litigant to air disputes "before judges who have not committed to rule against them before the opening brief is read."
92
Commission member Richard Emery has expressed similar frustrations about the New York rules. Emery concurred and dissented to the removal of Judge Thomas Spargo, who provided coffee and doughnuts to voters and committed other violations of the rules.
93
Emery found it "ironic" that the rules punish small giveaways to voters, but allow candidates to receive contributions from party officials, "as well as from the lawyers whose very livelihoods depend on the judges who receive their contributions." 94 The rules "are a patchwork of compromises and ad hoc judgments which fail to address the central causes of the unseemliness of judicial campaigns: party control and the candidate's need to raise money." 95 Therefore, the rules, according to Emery, are not narrowly tailored because they restrict candidates in the "opposite way one would expect in order to safeguard judicial integrity." 96 Counteracting the role of money in judicial campaigns is a much more urgent state interest than limiting what political positions candidates can take in an election. If there is a compelling state interest in an impartial judiciary, there are rules that the state can implement which would be far more effective toward reaching this goal and far less prohibitive on core speech interests than limiting judicial speech.
A It is likely impermissible for a judicial candidate to respond to questionnaires from political organizations. A 1999 Ethics Commission opinion indicates that judicial candidates may not respond to questionnaires if the questions pertain to issues that may come before the judge, as it would amount to a pledge, promise, commitment, or appearance of commitment. 107 This issue has been especially contentious in other states where some courts have determined that a survey of views is more like an announcement than a promise as the context indicates that a judge is not being asked to make specific commitments but only to set out an assortment of views. 108 Ultimately the key distinction in New York is that a statement is unlawful when it favors a single class of litigants. 109 Under this rubric, William Watson and Walter Hafner violated the rule by favoring law enforcement over criminal defendants. 110 Margaret Chan and Arthur Birnbaum violated the rule by favoring tenants over landlords. 111 Patrick McGrath violated this rule by favoring the interests of gunowners over the interests of non gun-owners. 112 However, it is hard to imagine any contested legal or political issue voters would care about in selecting a judge that does not involve favoring some classes of litigants over others in some way. Voters who care about crime will want a judge whose approach to crime would logically, in one way or another, disfavor criminals or criminal defendants if followed through. Voters who care about tenants will in some way want an advantage for tenants over landlords; presumably this is why they would take the time to select a judge who shares their interests. An announcement of views on a disputed 2013]
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issue lacks substantive meaning for voters if it cannot be coupled with some plan to act in a certain way while on the bench. Justice Ginsburg, dissenting in White, argued for the retention of the announce clause in order to preserve the promise clauses; without the announce clause, all promises could be disguised as nonbinding announcements. 113 But the inverse is also true. If a prohibition on announcements is unconstitutional, it is difficult to preserve a prohibition on promises, since many announcements can be construed as binding promises. This overlap is compounded by the inherent difficulty in distinguishing an announcement from a promise at all. A candidate's pro-life stance, for instance, runs the risk of being interpreted as either. 114 In addition, keeping one prohibition and not the other may create a chilling effect in which judicial candidates are intimidated from making constitutionally permissible announcements. 115 Advice given to New York judicial candidates indicates that judges should not air their views on disputed issues, regardless of what the rules say. 116 For these reasons, the promises clauses may not meet strict scrutiny and may violate the First Amendment rights of judicial candidates.
There is a strong tension between the need for an impartial judiciary and judicial elections in which candidates may be heard and voters may choose freely. 117 In White, the Supreme Court identified unlawful restrictions on speech in judicial elections. 118 Many states have since had difficulty determining the correct balance in policing judicial candidate speech. 119 New York has taken an aggressive approach, applying the pledges, promises, and commitments clauses to limit judicial speech. 120 This approach may be unconstitutional be-
